From Medals to Morality: Sportive Nationalism and the Problem of Doping in Sports by Koller, Dionne L.
Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 1 Fall Article 6
From Medals to Morality: Sportive Nationalism
and the Problem of Doping in Sports
Dionne L. Koller
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Dionne L. Koller, From Medals to Morality: Sportive Nationalism and the Problem of Doping in Sports, 19 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 91 (2008)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol19/iss1/6
FROM MEDALS TO MORALITY: SPORTIVE
NATIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF
DOPING IN SPORTS
DIONNE L. KOLLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Marion Jones is a national hero. While she boosted the prestige of the
United States during her amazing dominance of track and field, she
contributed to it even more when she went to prison for lying about her use of
performance-enhancing substances during that period. This is because
singling out Jones enabled the United States, unequivocally, to show moral
outrage over sports doping. Although Major League Baseball was at the time
mired in a performance-enhancing drug scandal of its own, it was Jones who
allowed the United States to demonstrate its unwavering resolve and moral
clarity on the issue. In giving her the maximum six months in prison, Judge
Kenneth Karas explained that he wanted to send a message to athletes that
cheating in sports is wrong, stating that "athletes in society ... serve as role
models to children around the world. When there is a widespread level of
cheating, it sends all the wrong messages."' Yet Karas, and the government
officials who supported Jones's harsh penalty, were not just sending a message
to elite athletes; they were sending a message to the world. Notwithstanding
the government's tap dancing around the issue of steroid use in professional
sports, the Jones prison sentence hoped to convey that the United States was
now officially tough on doping. 2
It is clear that Marion Jones broke the law when she lied to a grand jury
inquiring about her performance-enhancing drug use. However, her
spectacular fall from Olympic champion to convicted felon must be put in its
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge
Joseph Maher for his assistance with research.
1. Track Star Marion Jones Sentenced to 6 Months, CNN.coM, Jan. 11, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/01/1l/jones.doping/index.html (explaining that Jones's sentence
was based on the fact that the use of steroids "affects the integrity of athletic competition" and that he
hoped her sentence would "have a deterrent factor").
2. See MICHAEL D. GIARDINA, SPORTING PEDAGOGIES: PERFORMING CULTURE AND IDENTITY
IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 99 (2005) (explaining that the "figure of the American athlete - in fact the
whole of sporting culture in the United States - has become [re]-sutured into the various narratives
about the contested nature of freedom[s], patriotism[s], and democracy in a post-9/11 moment").
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proper context. That Jones was put before a grand jury and asked about her
performance-enhancing drug use in the Olympic Games would have been
unimaginable for our government officials not so long ago. When
international acclaim was to be had simply by winning Olympic medals, the
United States Government was happy to look the other way while prominent
athletes were accused of doping violations. Indeed, government officials
turned a blind eye to mountains of evidence that many of our Olympic athletes
were winning by doping. Competing against athletes from countries like East
Germany, the Soviet Union, and China, who were believed to use
performance-enhancing drugs to achieve athletic success, gave government
officials no incentive to clean up our doping problem. Marion Jones likely
had this system in mind when she took her "flaxseed oil" and became
America's sweetheart. Indeed, had she competed in the 1980s or early 1990s,
Jones would very likely be in her retirement now, enjoying the riches and
fame that those now-returned gold medals would bring. Instead, she went to
prison and helped usher in a new era in the American Olympic Movement.
The United States still wants to win in Olympic competition, 3 but now we
must do it with the moral authority that we do not cheat.
This essay seeks to go behind the common anti-doping rhetoric, which
explains the doping problem as one of cheating individuals and a misguided
private sector, to highlight the complexity of the government's relationship to
Olympic Movement sports and sports doping and the sports paradigm in which
this relationship takes place. In doing so, we can better understand the
impulses of a nation that once produced Marion Jones, and others like her, and
which now purports to be a worldwide leader in the fight against doping. It is
in understanding the true role of the government in a win-at-all-costs sports
paradigm that can ensure the anti-doping "cure" is not worse than the disease.
II. DOPING AND THE TEMPTATION OF ATHLETES
Reflecting the ethos of American society, doping is routinely portrayed as
a problem of the individual and not the culture. 4 Specifically, doping is a
3. Amy Shipley, Mettle, Not Medals, is Goal of United States Team; Olympic Officials
Emphasizing Character Instead of Athletic Achievement, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2008, at Al
[hereinafter Shipley, Goals of United States Team].
4. This is quite unlike the reaction in Canada to doping scandals such as that involving sprinter
Ben Johnson in the 1988 Olympics. Scholars have noted that the scandals in Canada provoked
national "shame" and were seen as a "national disgrace." Further, it was noted that "few" blamed
Johnson or rejected him, but instead the government attempted, through the Dubin Commission and
other forms of inquiry, to understand the root of the problem and the pressures athletes faced to win.
Bruce Kidd et al., Comparative Analysis of Doping Scandals: Canada Russia, and China, in DOPING
IN ELITE SPORT: THE POLITICS OF DRUGS IN THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT 153 (Wayne Wilson &
[Vol. 19:1
FROM MEDALS TO MORALITY
problem of an individual athlete gone wrong, an athlete who chose cheating
and greed over "clean" competition. Thus, the rhetoric of the anti-doping
movement is one of misguided individualism, and the temptation to cheat
rather than "work" for victory.5 As President Bush stated in his 2004 State of
the Union address: "the use of performance-enhancing drugs like steroids
in... sports... sends the wrong message - that there are shortcuts to
accomplishment, and that performance is more important than character."
6
Commentators note that with the rewards for athletic success so great, the
temptation to cheat is enormous. 7 For instance, scholars have explained the
doping problem in terms of game theory, the study of how players in a game
pursue strategies that will maximize their returns by anticipating the actions
that will be taken by other players. 8 Game theory has been applied to the
Edward Derse eds., 2001).
5. Darryl C. Wilson, "Let Them Do Drugs" - A Commentary on Random Efforts at Shot
Blocking in the Sports Drug Game, 8 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 53, 58-59 (2006) (explaining that it is
the "outlandish" potential for riches that drives athletes to cheat, because they are drawn to "doing
whatever it takes to compete and win a potential lifetime of riches."); The Drug Free Sports Act of
2005: Hearing on H.R. 1862, Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of
the H. Energy and Commerce Comm., 109th Cong. 5 (2005) [hereinafter The Drug Free Sports Act of
2005] (statement of Rep. Cliff Steams) (explaining that athletes' "better sports through chemistry
attitude replace [sic] hard work, dedication and honesty as the keys to success for our athletes... ").
6. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 81,
87-88 (Jan. 20, 2004). Some have noted, however, that the explanation of performance-enhancing
drug use as a "substitute" for the hard work of training is a mischaracterization. As explained by Paul
Haagen, "[p]erformance-enhancing substances are not a substitute for training, but an aid to training.
They cannot transform a bad athlete into a great athlete, nor can they permit even a great athlete to get
away with not training. They can, however, substantially improve the performance of athletes who
train hard." Paul H. Haagen, The Players Have Lost that Argument: Doping, Drug Testing and
Collective Bargaining, 40 NEW ENG. L. REv. 831, 835 (2006).
7. Matthew J. Mitten, Drug Testing of Athletes - An Internal, Not External, Matter, 40 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 797, 797 (2006) (explaining that "[i]n today's society, the economic and intangible
rewards for extra-ordinary athletic achievements and winning performances are substantial.
Therefore, there is a significant incentive for athletes to maximize their on-field performance, which
is the paramount objective of sports competition"). Shi-Ling Hsu, What Is a Tragedy of the
Commons? Overfishing and the Campaign Spending Problem, 69 ALB. L. REv. 75, 97 (2005); Joshua
H. Whitman, Winning at All Costs: Using Law & Economics to Determine the Proper Role of
Government in Regulating the Use of Performance-Enhancing Drugs in Professional Sports, 2008 U.
ILL. L. REv. 459, 459 (2008).
8. Michael Shermer, The Doping Dilemma, S¢I. AM., Apr. 2008, at 82-89. The classic example
of game theory is the prisoner's dilemma, where an individual and his partner are arrested for a crime
and held in separate cells. Neither wants to "rat" on the other. The prosecutor gives the each person
the following options: 1. If one confesses and the other does not, the individual who confessed goes
free and the other gets three years in prison; 2. If the other prisoner confesses and the first does not,
the first gets three years and the other goes free; 3. If both prisoners confess, each get two years; 4. If
both remain silent, then each get one year. With these choices, the logical course is to "rat" on your
partner and defect from the agreement to keep quiet; David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation and the
Multiple Meanings of Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331 (2001); Olympics Clean? Not Likely, CHI.
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athletic context by suggesting that although the rules of the game clearly
prohibit doping, athletes in sports such as cycling or track and field, where
doping is prevalent, will defect, and start doping as a way to maximize his or
her outcomes. Commentators have noted that because performance-enhancing
substances are so effective, detection is still difficult, and the payoff for using
such substances is so great, the incentive to use performance-enhancing
substances, and not compete clean, is high. Once a few athletes choose to
break ranks and violate the rules to gain a competitive advantage, this induces
others to do so as well. However, the penalties for doping are such that
athletes remain silent instead of openly communicating about how to remedy
the problem. 9 Thus, commentators have explained that doping is rational
individual behavior given the incentives in place in the current athletic system.
Athletes who follow the rules, therefore, "feel like suckers."' 0  The game
theory explanation is reflected in the actions of American weightlifter Mark
Cameron, who was caught doping at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games. In
explaining Cameron's conduct, the head of the United States Olympic
Committee's (USOC) medical delegation to the Games reportedly stated that
"he knew his test would be positive but he was playing a game. He felt the
statistics were on his side and he took the calculated risk that he wouldn't be
one of the athletes tested. He lost."II
These explanations of doping are consistent with American rhetoric in a
host of areas, especially in connection with sports. The focus is on
individualism and private choice, 12 and the drive to be the best. This is an
explanation frequently advanced by government officials. In the words of
Senator Joseph Biden: "athletes have always tried to improve their competitive
advantage and their performance on the playing field.., there's always been a
history of some using improper substances to be able to do that .... It's a
simple, basic proposition. It's cheating."' 13 What follows from this simplistic
TRIB., July 12, 2008, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-0712edit
2jul12,0,6352361.story (stating that athletes "game the system" and get away with using
performance-enhancing substances because they know that the chances of getting caught are small).
9. Shermer, supra note 8; Peter Brown, The Doping Game: Payoffs that Make Cheaters into
Losers, SCI. AM., Apr. 2008, at 88.
10. Brown, supra note 9.
11. Jan Todd & Terry Todd, Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic
Movement: 1960-1999, in DOPING IN ELITE SPORT: THE POLITICS OF DRUGS IN THE OLYMPIC
MOVEMENT, supra note 4, at 65, 74.
12. Bobby Julich, My Generation Must Continue to Tell Young Riders Not to Cheat, ESPN.COM,
July 18, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/tdf2007/news/story?id=2941115 (stating that athletes
who are doping are "making poor choices").
13. Hearing to Examine the International Convention Against Doping in Sport, adopted by
UNESCO on Oct. 19, 2005 as Treaty Doc.110-14: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Foreign
[Vol. 19:1
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explanation for doping in sports is that because individuals cannot be trusted
to do the right thing, the government must step in to protect the integrity of
sport. The assumption is that the government has little role in sports doping,
and is essential to the solution. In the words of Edwin Moses, former United
States Olympic gold medal winner,
The United States is unique among Western democracies in
not having a ministry of sport, because Americans generally
believe that less government is good and that private
organizations and the market can be trusted to do work that
affects the public trust. Whatever the merits of this
perspective in other contexts, the traditional deference to the
private organizations that govern sport is not warranted in the
case of doping... Notwithstanding the efforts of some well-
intentioned individuals, sports governing bodies in this
country and internationally have shown time and time again
that they are not structurally equipped for this work, nor are
they sufficiently accountable to the larger interests of society
that are affected by doping. 14
The sentiment expressed by Moses and many others is premised on the
notion that the government is a dispassionate third party in the relationship
between the nation and elite sport. To be sure, doping is cheating, but the
temptation to cheat and the ability to pull it off is manifest well beyond the
level of the individual athlete. With elite Olympic Movement sport, the
individual is connected to the national community, and the national
community is connected to the international community through a sporting
ideal that is both international in scope but nationalistic in execution. It is also
a sports paradigm that, at the highest levels, values winning over all else. Far
from being on the sidelines in this system, the United States government has
been and continues to be an important player in the American Olympic
Movement.
III. SPORT AND THE TEMPTATION OF THE STATE
The explanation of doping as an individual problem that grows out of bad
individual choices obscures the role that the United States government has
played in allowing the practice to take root. It also overlooks the nature of the
sporting environment in which the government's role was shaped. Thus, to be
Relations, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Chairman).
14. Edward H. Jurith & Mark W. Beddoes, The United States' and International Response to the
Problem of Doping in Sports, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 461,477 (2002).
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able to examine critically the government's role in doping in sport, it is
important to understand the relationship between the Government and
Olympic Movement sport and the origins of the current American Olympic
Movement structure. This relationship takes place in a sort of legal twilight
zone, caught between the private sector and the public interest. 15 Within this
twilight zone there is a collision between the nominally private status of sports
regulators in the United States and the powerful temptation on the part of the
government to use elite sport to demonstrate national supremacy through
winning.
A. The Use of Sport in the National Interest
Scholars have long recognized that sport can be used in multiple ways to
enhance nationalism. First, sport can be a powerful force for nationalism
domestically.16 Second, sport can be used to enhance a nation's prestige and
demonstrate supremacy in the international community. 17  Scholars have
noted that "nations are dependent upon the international sports world to
confirm their national stature," and in fact "the establishment of an
international athletic presence is not, therefore, a gratuitous matter for nations,
but rather the path they must currently follow if they expect to be recognized
and treated as a nation." 18 Thus, for most, if not all nations, elite sport is in
many respects viewed as a tool; it is not simply valued for the sake of its
inherent characteristics. 19 Political leaders often use sport to demonstrate the
superiority of their political system,20 and nations of all ideologies have long
recognized that athletic success, particularly within the Olympic Movement,
15. Dionne L. Koller, Frozen in Time: The State Action Doctrine's Application to Amateur
Sports, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 183, 184 (2008) [hereinafter Koller, Frozen in Time].
16. See Alan Bairner, Sportive Nationalism and Nationalist Politics: A Comparative Analysis of
Scotland, the Republic of Ireland, and Sweden, 20 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 314, 314-15 (1996).
17. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 461-462; RICHARD ESPY, THE POLITICS OF THE
OLYMPIC GAMES 7-8 (1979); James A.R. Nafziger, Legal Aspects of a United States Foreign Sports
Policy, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 837, 839-840 (1975).
18. William J. Morgan, Sport and the Making of National Identities: A Moral View, 24 J. PHIL.
SPORT 1, 3 (1997) (explaining that "[s]ince nations not only see themselves in this regard as members
of a larger, international community, but actively curry the favor of that community in seeking
validation of their own nationality, the bond between the national and international is equally strong
here.")
19. JoAnne D. Spotts, Global Politics and the Olympic Games: Separating the Two Oldest
Games in History, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 103-115 (1994); Jeffrey M. Marks, PoliticalAbuse of Olympic
Sport - DeFrantz v. United States Olympic Committee, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 155 (1981);
James A.R. Nafziger & Andrew Strenk, The Political Uses and Abuses of Sports, 10 CONN. L. REV.
259, 259 (1977); Nafziger, supra note 17, at 838.
20. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 461; MARTIN BARRY VINOKUR, MORE THAN A GAME:
SPORT AND POLITICS 17 (1988).
[Vol. 19:1
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furthers national interests. 21  This use of sport is referred to as "sportive
nationalism," which is defined as "the use of elite athletes by governments to
demonstrate national fitness and vitality for the purpose of enhancing national
prestige." 22  As one scholar has explained, "[s]portive nationalism is not a
single generic phenomenon; on the contrary, it is a complicated socio-political
response to challenges and events, both sportive and non-sportive, that must be
understood in terms of the varying national contexts in which it appears." 23
Nearly all nations to some degree use elite sport to enhance national
prestige. 24  This practice is most evident in Olympic Movement
competition. 25 Not surprisingly, sportive nationalism takes different forms in
different nations, "depending on the nature of the government that seeks
prestige benefits from international sporting success." 26  The sporting
paradigm in which expressions of nationalism take place is one that
emphasizes, above all else, winning.
There are several notorious examples of sportive nationalism. A leading
case is the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games, used by Hitler's regime as one part of
its propaganda campaign to promote Nazi ideology. 27 The Games were
21. Spotts, supra note 19, at 115; Nafziger, supra note 17, at 838; Nafziger & Strenk, supra note
19.
22. John Hoberman, Sportive Nationalism and Doping, in PROCEEDINGS FROM THE WORKSHOP,
RESEARCH ON DOPING IN SPORT 7 (The Research Council of Norway, 2001) [hereinafter Hoberman,
Sportive Nationalism and Doping]; John Hoberman, How Drug Testing Fails: The Politics of Doping
Control, in DOPING IN ELITE SPORT: THE POLITICS OF DRUGS IN THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT, supra
note 4, at 241,260 [hereinafter Hoberman, How Drug Testing Fails].
23. Bairner, supra note 16, at 315.
24. ESPY, supra note 17, at 4 ("All states use sport as a diplomatic tool."); Hoberman, Sportive
Nationalism and Doping, supra note 22, at 7, 9 (stating that "to the best of my knowledge, no sitting
government has ever renounced sportive nationalism as its fundamental approach to international
athletic competition," and that "[s]portive nationalism continues to prevail as national policy around
the world .... "); VINOKUR, supra note 20, at Il ("Governments and countries throughout the
world - regardless of political system - now seem to recognize that international sports victories have
a new political meaning.").
25. Scholars have pointed out that despite the lofty ideals, the Olympic Games have always been
a potent force to promote nationalism. ESPY, supra note 17; EAST PLAYS WEST; SPORT AND THE
COLD WAR (Stephen Wagg & David L. Andrews eds., Routledge 2007); Barrie Houlihan, Building an
International Regime to Combat Doping in Sport, in SPORT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AN
EMERGING RELATIONSHIP 62, 74-75 (Roger Levermore & Adrian Budd eds., Routledge 2004)
(explaining "over the last 40 years, many, indeed most, of the major sporting states have, at worst,
ruthlessly exploited international in general and the Olympic Games in particular for a variety of
ideological and nationalistic purposes... few states have been prepared to value sport for its intrinsic
qualities.").
26. See generally Hoberman, Sportive Nationalism and Doping, supra note 22, at 7.
27. ROB BEAMISH & IAN RITCHIE, FASTEST, HIGHEST, STRONGEST: A CRITIQUE OF HIGH-
PERFORMANCE SPORT 32-35 (2006) (explaining that the 1936 Olympics provided Hitler with a
"propaganda victory" because of its impressive organization of the Games as well as its athletes'
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awarded to Germany to help restore it in the world community after its defeat
in World War I, and Hitler's regime developed a state-sponsored sports
training program to develop athletes for the Games and support Hitler's vision
of Aryan supremacy. 28 In the Post World War II era, East Germany
successfully used sport as a tool to achieve its foreign policy objectives. 29 As
it was in the former Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries, the
government completely controlled the sports system, which emphasized,
above all else, winning. 30  The ultimate goal was to demonstrate the
superiority of the East German political system 31 and to gain acceptance as
part of the international community. 32 It was long suspected, and subsequently
confirmed, that the government-sponsored sports program included the
systematic administration of performance-enhancing substances, such as
anabolic steroids, to many of its male and female athletes to increase their
success in Olympic Movement competition. 33 The East German program had
convincing results, from both a sporting and diplomatic view. East Germany
won record numbers of medals in international competition 34 and during this
time "gained diplomatic recognition by a majority of the states of the
world. ' 35 Similarly, the Soviet Union used international athletic competition
to great political advantage, relating its athletes' success to what it claimed
was the "superiority of the Soviet political system." 36 Today, China is a
leading example of using sport for political purposes. It hopes that by hosting
the Beijing Olympics it can solidify its place in the modern international
successful performance).
28. Id.
29. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 463-64. VINOKUR, supra note 20, at 59; Nafziger &
Strenk, supra note 19, at 262 ("The German Democratic Republic has used sports to gain diplomatic
recognition more aggressively and successfully than any country in the world." East Germany
worked "to use sport as a lever to remove the barriers which isolated them from the Western
World.").
30. VINOKUR, supra note 20, at 98.
31. Id. at 88.
32. Id.; ESPY, supra note 17, at 32-35.
33. Houlihan, supra note 25, at 64 (describing East Germany and the Soviet Union as
"subversives" within the early movements to combat doping in sport, and explaining that in both
nations "state organized doping was firmly established behind a public front of pompous
condemnation of drug use as contrary to the spirit of Olympism and a problem confined to the
commercialized West.").
34. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 19, at 264.
35. VINOKUR, supra note 20, at 59.
36. Id. at 98, 109 (explaining that "[tihe leaders of the Soviet Union have always considered
sport to be a key aspect of international politics," and that "a frequent Soviet media tactic ... is to
proclaim that Soviet sports victories are another verification of the superiority of the Soviet system").
[Vol. 19:1
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B. Sportive Nationalism in the United States
The United States has long embraced the win-at-all-costs sports paradigm
that prevails today. In Olympic Movement competition, this has meant medal
targets and performance bonuses for medal winners. More generally, this
reflects the fact that in the United States, it is being the best and not just
showing up that is rewarded. Yet, expressions of sportive nationalism in the
United States present a challenge to our government. On the one hand, our
nation revels in American athletes' success. At the same time, the United
States wants to make it clear that while Olympic victories reflect well on our
political system, they are not a product of it. It is sportive nationalism with a
capitalist twist, and there are no legal restraints to using sport in this way.38
Unlike nations such as the former East Germany and the Soviet Union, the
United States government traditionally did not use Olympic Movement sport
as an international relations tool. 39 Nevertheless, over the last thirty years,
sportive nationalism has been a significant part of United States' foreign
policy. 40  Yet despite the many examples4 1 of United States sportive
37. Paul Mooney, Preparing for the 2008 Beying Olympic Games, China's Authorities Go After
Human-Rights Advocates, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 14, 2008, available at
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2008/02/14/preparing-for-the-2008-beijing-olympic-
games-chinas-authorities-go-after-human-rights-advocates.html.; S. L. Price, Olympic China, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 13, 2007, at 72; Orville Schell, What Drives China: The Roots of a National
Inferiority Complex, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 4, 2008; Amy Shipley and Maureen Fan, In Run-Up to
Beiing Games, a Gold Rush: China Defines Success by Precious Medals, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2008,
at Al. China has long been accused of using doping to achieve international athletic success.
Throughout the 1990s, Chinese athletes in sports such as swimming were breaking long-held world
records and winning gold medals as they never had before. See also generally Todd & Todd, supra
note 11.
38. See generally Nafziger, supra note 17.
39. Id.
40. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 19, at 259; VINOKUR, supra note 20, at 108.
41. Most commonly, of course, sportive nationalism is apparent in political rhetoric, with
government officials often stating that American athletes reflect what is best about the United States.
For instance, as stated by President Bill Clinton, in an address to Olympic athletes competing in the
1996 Atlanta Olympic Games: "So tonight when you walk into that opening ceremony ... you carry
the symbol of all that we have become, not only in fact, but in the eyes and spirit and the hopes of the
rest of the world. And just as surely as those of us who work in the diplomatic area or the fine people
who wear the uniform of the United States military, you will become a symbol... you are a source of
enormous pride to our country and an inspiration to the world." Remarks to the United States
Olympic Team in Atlanta, Georgia, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1156, 1158 (July 19, 1996). President George W.
Bush reflected the same sentiments of the United States' athletes as "symbols" or "ambassadors" of
the United States, stating that: "For our athletes, a place on America's team is the culmination of
years spent training and competing. They are proving that persistence and teamwork can help meet
high goals. They are performing with honor, conducting themselves with humility, and serving as
2008]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
nationalism, the government, and by extension, sports officials, the media, 42
and the American public downplay, and even ignore the obvious relationship
between sports and international relations." 43 Indeed, to distinguish the United
States from countries like the former Soviet Union, East Germany and China,
our government officials have often minimized the role of elite sports in
international affairs. 44 The reality, however, is that the United States over the
last thirty years has recognized the importance of sport in international affairs
and has positioned the United States Olympic Movement to enhance the
nation's prestige. 45
In doing so, the United States government effectively filters its sportive
nationalism through a privatized Olympic Movement structure, codified by the
Amateur Sports Act of 1978, which provides no role for the government in the
regulation of sport. 46 This structure was a deliberate effort to contrast the
United States with the Communist sports systems of the former Eastern Bloc.
In the 1970s, the overwhelming success of the Soviet Bloc in international
competition, during the height of the Cold War, put pressure on the United
States to match their sporting success. 47 Our comparative weakness in
ambassadors of peace and goodwill to the entire world. By showing respect for every competitor,
they are showing America's respect for the world ...." The President's Radio Address, 40 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOc. 1603, 1603 (Aug. 14, 2004). In addition, the United States' efforts in hosting
multiple Olympic Games evidence sportive nationalism. Since 1984, the United States government
has spent at least $2.1 billion (in 1999 dollars) to stage the Los Angeles (1984), Atlanta (1996) and
Salt Lake City (2002) Olympic Games, and we currently have a bid to host another. United States
Government Accountability Office Report, Olympic Games: Preliminary Information on Federal
Funding and Support: Report to Congressional Requesters.
42. Laura S. Stewart, Comment, Has the United States Anti-Doping Agency Gone too Far?
Analyzing the Shift from "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt" to "Comfortable Satisfaction", 13 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 207, 219 (2006) (noting the "scant" attention paid by the United States media to
the revelation that many famous United States Olympic athletes were doping during the 1980s).
43. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 19, at 259; VfNOKUR, supra note 20, at xii (explaining that
sport's relationship to politics "has been little explored").
44. Nafziger & Strenk, supra note 19, at 259 (explaining that "United States sports officials,
journalists, politicians, and the public often ignore the relationship between sports and international
politics").
45. Such a development is consistent with the United States' growing awareness of sport as an
international relations tool. VINOKUR, supra note 20, at 18 (explaining that "[a]s the awareness by
governments of the significance of sports in domestic and international politics grows, they will tend
to increase control of sports to advance their own political goals").
46. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 476-77; Dionne L. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply to
the Actions of the United States Anti-Doping Agency?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91, 94-95 (2005)
[hereinafter Koller, Does the Constitution Apply].
47. Nafziger, supra note 17, at 854 ("The United States government clearly should develop a
comprehensive and coherent foreign sports policy ...."); Peter J. Beck, "The Most Effective Means
of Communication in the World"?: British Sport and National Prestige, in SPORT AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AN EMERGING RELATIONSHIP 77, 84 (Roger Levermore & Adrian
(Vol. 19:1
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international competition prompted President Ford to establish the
Commission on Olympic Sports (the "Commission") to study the issue. The
Commission noted at the outset that "in international sport... American
performances are deteriorating. Against athletes from nations for whom
Olympic medals are as precious as moon rocks, U.S. competitors seem to have
steadily diminishing chances of success." 48 The United States understood by
this time that the international sporting community supported a form of sport
and competition that emphasized nationalism and winning.49
Given this, the result of the Commission's work was a uniquely American
style for Olympic Movement sport regulation, and by extension, our
nationalistic uses of sport that focused on fostering "individual athletic
achievement."' 50  Unlike many countries that participate in the Olympic
Movement, the United States does not have an official government agency or
ministry for sports. Instead, the Commission's primary recommendation was
to create a centralized sports organization that had the exclusive right to select
athletes for Olympic Movement competition. 51 The Commission rejected a
role for the federal government, preferring instead to rely on privately
incorporated National Governing Bodies (NGBs) to develop athletes.
As a result of the Commission's report, Congress passed the Amateur
Sports Act of 1978, which restructured what was the former USOC so that it
would function as an institution to coordinate the United States' amateur
athletic development. 52 The Act gave the USOC the exclusive power to
"coordinate and develop amateur athletic activity in the United States, directly
related to international amateur athletic competition ... " and "to obtain for the
United States, directly or by delegation to the appropriate national governing
body, the most competent amateur representation possible in each event of the
Olympic Games," among other things. 53 The Act made the USOC a federally
chartered, non-profit private corporation, 54 not a government agency, with the
Budd eds., 2004); As stated by the House Judiciary Committee: "the overall decline of American
achievement in Olympic and international competition was apparent. For a nation of almost 250
million people, we were falling seriously below our potential to. .. field strong international teams..
* ." Amateur Sports Act of 1978, H.R. Rep. No. 95-1627, at [pinpoint cite for quote] (1978).
48. Amateur Sports Act: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 95th Cong. 40 (1977) [hereinafter Amateur Sports Act Hearings] (statement of Gerald
B. Zornow on Behalf of the President's Commission on Olympic Sports).
49. Morgan, supra note 18 (explaining that the international sporting order links nationalism and
international interests because the international athletic community encourages nationalistic displays).
50. Amateur Sports Act Hearings, supra note 48.
51. Id.
52. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 554 (1987).
53. Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. § 220503(2), (4) (2006).
54. Id. § 220502(a)-(b).
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authority to oversee the various NGBs for all recognized Olympic sports. The
NGBs establish specific eligibility criteria for athletes in their respective
sports. In addition, the Act gives the USOC the authority to represent the
United States in relations with international athletic bodies, to resolve conflicts
and disputes related to Olympic athletics, and to provide financial assistance to
organizations in furtherance of USOC goals. 55
Despite the fact that in 1978 Congress was well aware of the problems
with performance-enhancing drug use in Olympic Movement sports, neither
the Commission nor the resulting Amateur Sports Act mentioned the issue.
Instead, the Act specifically aimed to maximize the United States' prestige in
two ways. First, the United States wanted to produce athletes who would be
successful in elite international competition. Second, the United States was
determined to demonstrate its supremacy in the international order through the
very structure of American Olympic Movement sport. The United States was
intent on producing winning athletes but it would do so without the
government control exercised by its Cold War enemies.
Yet structuring the USOC as a private, and not a government, agency
represents one of sportive nationalism's most potent legal implications.
Rather than put amateur athletic development under the control of the national
government, as it was in Communist nations, the federal government chose to
structure the United States Olympic Movement through a private, federally
chartered corporation. 56  Therefore, as with privatization of traditional
government services, relying on the private sector for Olympic Movement
regulation "strips away the traditional legal methods for enforcing
accountability" 57 because the requisite "state action" is not present to trigger
constitutional protections. 58 The only possibility that the Constitution could
be applied is through the state action doctrine, whereby constitutional
restrictions are applied to private entities in circumstances where it fairly can
be said that the state is responsible for the conduct at issue because of its
relationship to the private actor. 59 Thus, sportive nationalism expressed in a
way that threatens athletes' rights might be left without a constitutional
55. Id. § 220505(c)(l)-(6).
56. Id. § 220503.
57. Michele Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569,
573 (2001) (explaining that due process protections would attach to the denial of welfare benefits
when the government had control of the program).
58. The state action doctrine provides that before a right can be asserted under the federal
constitution, it must be shown that the alleged violation of the right was perpetrated by actions of the
state. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, et al. 531 U.S. 288 (2001);
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S 179 (1988).
59. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
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remedy.
The private structure and the resulting absence of constitutional
protections for Olympic Movement athletes might not be of concern if sportive
nationalism simply could not exist in a privatized Olympic Movement. That
is, if sportive nationalism involves the government using elite sport to enhance
international prestige, a question is whether sportive nationalism in the United
States could even exist in a way that threatens athletes' rights, given the
private structure of the USOC and now the United States Anti-Doping Agency
(USADA). The answer is that, in its uniquely American way, 60 sportive
nationalism has proven to survive, and indeed, thrive, in a privatized Olympic
Movement. The reliance on the private sector however has the potential to
threaten athletes' rights because when international interests are at stake, the
federal government has ignored the private status of the USOC in favor of
pursuing the national interest. 61 Because of sportive nationalism's political
dimension, courts are hesitant to step in when their expression potentially
affects athletes' rights. For instance, after the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan prior to the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, President Carter
and Congress called on the USOC to boycott the Games. 62 The President
made clear that whatever the USOC decided, he would take all steps necessary
to enforce his decision not to send a team to Moscow. 63 Not surprisingly, the
USOC voted not to send a team to the Games. 64 Despite the considerable
evidence that the federal government, and specifically President Carter, made
the decision not to send a team to the 1980 Olympic Games, the court,
considering an athletes' challenge to the boycott, held that the President and
federal government held only the power of "persuasion" over the USOC. 65
According to the court, the government did not have sufficient "control" over
the USOC to justify a finding of state action to support the athletes'
constitutional law claims. Significantly, the court explained that holding the
President and government's efforts to influence the USOC to boycott the
Games as sufficient for a finding of state action would bring the courts into a
60. See generally Hoberman, Sportive Nationalism and Doping, supra note 22 (explaining that
sportive nationalism can take different forms depending on the ideology of the government practicing
it).
61. See DeFrantz v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 492 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1980); see also James
A.R. Nafziger, Diplomatic Fun and the Games: A Commentary on the United States Boycott of the
1980 Summer Olympics, 17 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 67 (1980).
62. Marks, supra note 19, at 155.
63. Id. at 156.
64. See DeFrantz, 492 F. Supp. 1181, aft'd, 701 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (declining to enjoin
the USOC from carrying out its resolution of April 12, 1980, not to send a team to Moscow).
65. Id. at 1194.
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"nonjusticiable realm" because of the politics involved. 66
This "nonjusticiable realm" in the view of the DeFrantz Court included
using athletes for foreign policy purposes. 67  Significantly, however, the
DeFrantz Court did not confront the issue of using athletes in a way that
stripped them of their eligibility to compete at all. The disappointed 1980
Olympians retained their eligibility for international competition; they were
denied the opportunity to compete only in the 1980 Olympic Games. It
therefore remains an open question as to whether a court would step in and
check sportive nationalism practiced in a way that did not simply deny an
athlete the ability to compete in one competition, but denied the athlete the
right to compete at all. 68 Moreover, it is unclear how a court would view the
actions of USADA, as a strong case can be made that in certain circumstances
it engages in state action.69 Accordingly, although the American Olympic
Movement operates in many ways as a private sector corporation, history has
shown that the USOC is subject to considerable government influence. 70
66. Id.
67. S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987). In 1987, the Supreme
Court in San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee, ruled in a 5-4 decision
that constitutional restraints did not apply to the USOC's actions in a case involving the use of the
Olympic trademark. Id. The Court held that "neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur
sports has been a traditional government function," so that the restraints of the Constitution did not
apply to the USOC's actions. Id. at 553-54. The dissent recognized the incongruity of such a
holding, stating that the "representation function" of the USOC is of particular significance here
"because an organization that need not adhere to the Constitution cannot meaningfully represent this
Nation. The Government is free, of course, to 'privatize' some functions it would otherwise perform.
But such privatization ought not automatically release those who perform Government functions from
constitutional obligations." Id. at 560 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The irony pointed out by the dissent
is even greater considering that the United States Olympic Movement was established as a private
sector endeavor to represent what was superior about the United States political system. However, it
is apparent that what the Olympic Movement in the United States was really structured to
demonstrate was the superiority of capitalism, and not necessarily the values of individual rights as
reflected in the Constitution. Given the changes in the conduct of the USOC and its relationship to
the federal government as well as the importance of the athletes' interests now affected by decisions
of the USOC (and USADA), it is not clear whether that holding would be expanded to include an
athlete eligibility dispute.
68. I have made the argument previously that court involvement might be justified where
expressions of sportive nationalism strip athletes of eligibility without appropriate Due Process
protections. See Dionne L. Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices Athletes'
Constitutional Rights in the Pursuit of National Prestige, BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2008)
[hereinafter Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices].
69. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply, supra note 46, at 116-36.
70. For example, Congress did not hesitate to step in and force reforms to the USOC
management structure in the wake of corruption and management scandals. Olympic Family -
Functional or Dysfunctional?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and
Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005); Legislative Efforts to Reform the US.
Olympic Committee: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the
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Yet, notwithstanding the fact that the government has shown its
willingness to step in with the "private" American Olympic Movement when
necessary to protect the national image, the government and the public persist
in viewing sport as a private matter. Even beyond the boycott situation, courts
have reinforced this view, further reflecting the practice of sportive
nationalism that has, since the Commission report, cultivated an image of
American Olympic Movement sport as an individual, private sector pursuit.
For instance, the Supreme Court held in San Francisco Arts & Athletic v.
United States Olympic Committee that the USOC's role is a private sector one,
and not a public function. Although the Court did not deal with an athlete
dispute, 71 the Court's opinion in San Francisco Arts viewed the regulation of
amateur athletics as fundamentally private, and not a government
prerogative. 72 The dissent, in contrast, emphasized the real-world foreign
relations functions that the United States Olympic Movement serves: 73
Although at one time amateur sports was a concern merely of private
entities, and the Olympic Games an event of significance only to individuals
with a particular interest in athletic competition, that era is passed. In the
Amateur Sports Act of 1978, Congress placed the power and prestige of the
United States Government behind a single, central sports organization.
Congress delegated to the USOC functions that Government actors
traditionally perform - the representation of the Nation abroad. .. 74
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003); Does the U.S. Olympic Committee's
Organizational Structure Impede its Mission: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003); U.S.
Olympic Committee Reform Act of 2003: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003); State of the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC): Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 108th Cong. (2003); Investigation of the
Olympic Scandal: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th
Cong. (1999); Oversight ofActivities of the Olympic Committee: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Consumer of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103rd Cong. (1994).
71. The facts of San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Committee pertain to
the use of the word "Olympic" by a non-USOC entity. 483 U.S. 522, 525-527 (1987). The non-profit
sponsor of an event it called the "Gay Olympic Games" found itself embroiled in a lawsuit with the
USOC which denied the "Gay Olympic Games" sponsor the use of the Olympic trademark. Id. at
527.
72. Id. at 543-45.
73. Id. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The USOC performs a distinctive, traditional
governmental function: it represents this Nation to the world community .... As the Olympic Games
have grown in international visibility and importance, the USOC's role as our national representative
has taken on increasing significance. Although the Olympic ideals are avowedly non-political,
Olympic participation is inescapably nationalist.").
74. Id. at 559-60. The representation function of our athletes in the Olympic Games, and the
presence of our political leaders at the Games are apparent in the current climate. Although the
United States openly opposed, in 1993, China's bid to host the Olympic Games in 2000 because of
human rights issues, President Bush has recently stated that he would attend the opening ceremonies
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Justices Brennan and Marshall further underscored this point, stating that
"the [Amateur Sports] Act gave the USOC authority and responsibilities that
no private organization in this country had ever held."' 75  The dissent
explained that this function has become increasingly important as the Olympic
Games have grown in importance. 76 The dissent asserted that Congress put
the "power and prestige of the United States Government" behind the
USOC. 7 7 It is now doing the same with USADA. Thus, the notion that
Olympic Movement sport in the United States is simply the result of private
and not public action likely has more value as Cold War propaganda than a
basis in reality. The conduct of the American Olympic Movement can be
traced back to our government just as surely as if there was an official
government ministry for sport. That is because the conduct of the American
Olympic Movement is not just reflected in the government's actions, but in the
government's decision not to take action. Thus, whatever the benefits of the
"private" distinction, it enabled the United States to ignore the issue of sports
doping for decades while reaping the benefits of international sporting success.
IV. SPORTIVE NATIONALISM AND DOPING
As explained above, the sporting paradigm in which the Amateur Sports
Act was passed, and the "private" structure of the American Olympic
Movement that was crafted, valued, above all else, winning medals. 18 In the
United States, while winning in Olympic Movement sport was a reflection on
the government, it was not officially a product of it. However, scholars have
long argued that it is impossible to distinguish "private" from "public" acts 79
because all conduct can be traced to some decision of the state to either
affirmatively permit conduct, or a decision not to prohibit it.80 It is in this way
that sports doping in the United States is a product of government action. That
is, although it had knowledge of the doping problem, the government did little
to intervene when our Olympic, and later professional, athletes used
of the 2008 Games in Beijing, noting the sensitive foreign policy implications if he were not to attend.
75. Id. at 557.
76. Id. at 550.
77. Id. at 559.
78. Shipley, Goals of United States Team, supra note 3 (explaining the USOC's practice of
establishing "medal targets" for the United States' participation in the Olympic Games).
79. See Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the
Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 334 (1993). "The overwhelming
weight of published academic opinion has rejected the premise that legal doctrine can rest on a
supposed distinction between public and private acts." Id.
80. Id.; Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1349, 1351 (1982).
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performance enhancing substances to substantially increase their chances of
achieving success. This is because the "medals" paradigm in which the
Amateur Sports Act was passed gave the government every incentive to do
nothing.
A. Cold War Sportive Nationalism - Medals Without Morality
Because of the undeniable advantages that athletes using performance
enhancing drugs have over those who do not,81 sportive nationalism in a
"medals" paradigm creates temptations for governments either to affirmatively
dope athletes to achieve success in international competition, like the former
East Germany, or, as the United States government did, turn a blind eye and
allow sports doping to take place. Thus, the traditional thinking has been that
sportive nationalism undermines efforts to fight doping in Olympic Movement
sport because it creates incentives for governments to tolerate doping to
achieve athletic success.82 Critics have suggested that sportive nationalism
"can only encourage" a nation's tacit acceptance of doping. 83 This was
certainly the case with the United States, which did little to stop doping in
sports for decades. 84 The focus for the United States, it seemed, was not
combating performance-enhancing drug use, but combating the Eastern Bloc's
success in Olympic Movement competition.
This approach was possible because of the structure of the American
Olympic Movement that was established by the Amateur Sports Act. Without
any specific mention in the Act, and consistent with the government's
emphasis on the free market to develop world-class athletes, the effort to
control doping by Olympic Movement athletes was left to the private sector.
81. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 463-64 (explaining that doping "increases the chances of
winning").
82. See generally Hoberman, Sportive Nationalism and Doping, supra note 22. The link between
sportive nationalism and steroid use has strong Cold War roots. This link likely started with World
War II, as scholars have described the way the United States and Europe were "haunted" by anabolic
steroids because of the widely-held belief that Nazi soldiers were routinely injected with steroids to
make them "hyper-masculinized, ultra-aggressive" fighters. This use of steroids continued after the
war, and became a feature of the sportive nationalism that was an important part of the political life of
Communist, totalitarian regimes. This use of performance-enhancing substances to heighten athletic
performance, in the words of one commentator, "stalked" Western Europe and the United States
because the steroid enriched Nazi soldiers had been replaced "with testosterone-enriched male and
androgenized female communist athletes" who dominated much of Olympic Movement competition.
BEAMISH & RITCHIE, supra note 27, at 31.
83. Hoberman, How Drug Testing Fails, supra note 22, at 262; Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14,
at 463-464 (explaining that "doping has been condoned at virtually all levels of sports administration
because it increases the chances of winning...").
84. Stewart, supra note 42, at 211; Houlihan, supra note 25, at 64 (explaining that the United
States Government, at best, was "apathetic" on the issue of doping).
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The USOC administered drug testing through each sport's NGB, which was
also charged with prosecuting athletes for doping violations under the NGB's
own administrative procedures. 85 Accordingly, the USOC and NGBs, which
were charged with selecting athletes for Olympic and international
competition, also administered drug testing and determined the sanctions.8 6
This arrangement prompted critics to argue that the USOC and NGBs had an
inherent conflict of interest that prevented them from administering a credible
drug testing and sanctioning program. 87
The pressures on athletes to dope, and the subsequent conflict of interest
inherent in the testing and sanctioning regime administered by the USOC, did
not go unnoticed by Congress. For instance, as early as 1973, even before the
Amateur Sports Act was passed, Congress held a hearing on doping in
sports. 88 At that hearing, Congress heard testimony from a former Olympian
who effectively stated that sportive nationalism led individual athletes to
doping. As stated by Phil Shinnick,
Athletics should be defined by the individual, but
unfortunately, in American sports and in our society, there
seems to be a structure that has a high emphasis on
winning.., there seems to be political pressures on athletes
especially during these times, to win ... for the country...
When I was assistant chief of the mission to the 1965 World
University Games in Budapest ... I was under constant
pressure from the gentlemen at the State Department to beat
the "Commies. 89
Shinnick also testified unequivocally that American athletes, including
himself and several other Olympic champions, used performance-enhancing
substances such as anabolic steroids and amphetamines. 90 Similarly, former
Olympic Gold medalist Harold Connolly powerfully testified that "by 1968,
85. Travis T. Tygart, Winners Never Dope and Finally, Dopers Never Win: USADA Takes over
Drug Testing of United States Olympic Athletes, I DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 124,
126 (2003); Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 476.
86. 36 U.S.C. § 220503(4) (2006). The USOC is directed "to obtain ... the most competent
amateur representation possible in each event of the Olympic Games." Id.
87. Tygart, supra note 85, at 126; Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 476.
88. See Proper and Improper Use of Drugs by Athletes: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. to
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. (1973).
89. Id. at 139 (statement of Phil Shinnick, Director of Athletics, Livingston College, Rutgers
University).
90. Id. at 134-39.
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athletes in every event were using anabolic steroids and stimulants." 91
Connolly described the "state of openness" that had developed to the point
where, at the 1968 Olympic trials, "any number of athletes on the 1968
Olympic team.., had so much scar tissue and so many puncture holes in their
backsides that it was difficult to find a fresh spot to give them a new shot." 92
Public examples of athlete doping continued through the 1970s and 1980s.
For instance, as mentioned above, at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games,
weightlifter Mark Cameron was disqualified for steroid use. The USOC did
not support the disqualification, but instead railed against the International
Olympic Committee for imposing it. The head of the USOC medical
delegation acknowledged that Cameron had been doping, but that Cameron
had taken the chance that he would not be selected for testing and
miscalculated. Cameron was not dropped from the team and was permitted to
remain with the team in the Olympic village. 93 At the 1983 Pan American
Games, twelve members of the United States Track and Field team abruptly
flew home before competing after sports officials used a new screening
procedure for testosterone that caught at least fifteen athletes. The track and
field athletes apparently did not want to risk taking the test. 94 Prior to the
1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, the USOC's drug testing program
produced eighty-six positive tests. Nevertheless, the results were not made
public and no athlete was prevented from competing.95 It was later reported
that numerous positive test results from the 1984 Games were covered up.96
These incidents, as well as other evidence of the prevalence of performance-
enhancing drug use in the American Olympic Movement were presented to
Congress. 97 In 1989, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on "The
Steroid Abuse Problem in America." 98 At that hearing, there was testimony
91. Id. at 274 (statement of Harold Connolly, former Olympic champion; track and field coach,
Santa Monica High School, Cal.).
92. Id.
93. Todd & Todd, supra note 12, at 74.
94. Id. at 79.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 101.
97. See Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign
Commerce, and Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong.
(1995) (statement of L. Richard Rader, former pentathlon athlete) (explaining that in 1986, all
members of the men's modem pentathlon world championship team tested positive for banned
substances, yet the USOC allowed them to participate in competition. Rader noted that "Americans
tested positive in the 1984 and 1988 Olympics. The USOC took no action." He also explained that
these incidents "gave credence to estimates of doping in pentathlon as high as 70-80 percent during
the 1970s and 1980s).
98. Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports - The Medical and Social Costs of Steroid
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that described how the USOC's pre-Olympic testing program actually helped
our athletes beat official drug tests, and that "at least 40% of the women's
[Olympic track and field] team in Seoul ha[d] probably used steroids at some
time in their preparation for the games." 99 One expert testified that in 1984
and 1985, the USOC did unannounced drug tests of a variety of sports and
found that fifty percent of the tested athletes were positive for steroid use. 100
This expert testified that a member of an NGB had stated that "if we were
informed we could not select an athlete taking steroids, we simply wouldn't
have a team." 10 1  Similarly, there were numerous media reports of
performance-enhancing drug use by American athletes. 102 For instance, at the
1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, only two positives were officially announced,
despite the fact that one of the individuals heading up the testing effort stated
that many more positives were discovered. 10 3 In the lead-up to the Atlanta
Games, the USOC was conducting out-of-competition testing, but with forty-
eight hours notice to athletes. Moreover, the testing was limited to a handful
of sports. 104 There was evidence that numerous medalists were allowed to
compete in Olympic competition after failing drug tests. 105 Reports were that
over 100 athletes who tested positive for banned substances between 1998 and
2000 were cleared and allowed to compete. 106
The doping problems, of course, were not simply limited to the Olympic
Movement, but were a significant problem in professional sports as well. 107
Abuse: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1(1989).
99. Id. at 7 (statement of Pat Connolly, Coach and Trainer).
100. Anabolic Steroid Restriction Act of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 49 (1989) (statement of Dr. Charles Yesalis, Pennsylvania State
University Professor).
101. Id. at 46.
102. See generally Todd & Todd, supra note 11.
103. Hoberman, How Drug Testing Fails, supra note 22, at 253.
104. Todd & Todd, supra note 11, at 103.
105. These individuals were identified in documents released to Sports Illustrated by former
USOC anti-doping chief Dr. Wade Exum in 2003. CBC Sports, 10 Drug Scandals, CBC.cA, Jan. 19,
2003, http://www.cbc.ca/sports/indepth/drugs/stories/topl0.html; see also Peter McEntergart,
Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 21, 2003, at 21.
106. CBC Sports, supra note 105.
107. Wilson, supra note 5, at 72-73; see generally Scott B. Shapiro, Who Decides: Institutional
Choice in Determining a Performance Enhancing Drug Policy for the NFL, 7 WYO. L. REv. 183
(2007); see generally Paul A. Fortenberry and Brian E. Hoffman, Illegal Muscle, A Comparative
Analysis of Proposed Steroid Legislation and the Policies in Professional Sport's CBAs that Led to
the Steroid Controversy, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 121 (2006); see generally David K. Osei, Doping,
Juicing and Executive Bypass Oversight: A Case Study of Major League Baseball's Steroid Scandal,
4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 155-56 (2004); see generally Haagen, supra note 6; see generally Mitten,
supra note 7.
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This too, was well known to Congress. In 1973, there was testimony before
Congress that there was a culture of doping in professional football and
baseball. 10 8  Nevertheless, despite the ample evidence of doping in the
American Olympic Movement, Congress did nothing to respond to the
problem, 10 9 passing the Amateur Sports Act without any mention of doping,
and taking no action thereafter. During this time, the United States'
performance in Olympic Movement competition was strong and medal counts
were up. The incentive was to simply do nothing and allow the "private"
American Olympic Movement to regulate itself. Additionally, the United
States was not inclined to take serious steps to fight doping in the American
Olympic Movement programs, because it was believed that the Communist
nations were routinely doping their athletes110 to win, and in international
relations, winning was the goal.
It follows, of course, that if sport can be used to enhance a nation's
prestige, a nation's sporting policy and practice may also diminish it.'II This
was the case for the United States. By the 1990s, our sporting policies had
yielded substantial success. But those successes were coupled with the
worldwide belief that our athletes' wins were fueled by doping. 112 The
overwhelming international perception was that the United States was not
doing enough to fight the use of performance-enhancing drugs by its Olympic
athletes 113 and that the USOC simply covered it up. 114 The United States was
108. Proper and Improper Use of Drugs by Athletes: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. to
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 138, 141-143 (1973)
(statement of Phil Shinnick, Director of Athletics, Livingston College, Rutgers University).
109. With respect to professional sports doping, it has been noted that Congress left the issue to
the collective bargaining process because it seemed like an employment issue and not a transcendent
issue of national importance. Haagen, supra note 6, at 840.
110. Houlihan, supra note 25, at 66.
111. Beck, supra note 47, at 78 (noting sports "propaganda potential" for reflecting, enhancing,
and diminishing a nation's international prestige).
112. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 463 (stating that "regrettably, the United States is
considered by many to be the worst offender").
113. Id. at 475; Tygart, supra note 85, at 124; The Drug Free Sports Act of 2005, supra note 5, at
18 (statement of Frank Shorter, former Chairman, U.S. Anti-Doping Agency) ("In the 1990s, the
world did not view the United States as being committed to preventing doping amongst its Olympic
athletes." Shorter also explained that failing to adequately regulate performance enhancing drug use
in United States sport "undermines the image of the United States and our athletes as being
committed to drug-free sport.").
114. Ryan Connolly, Balancing the Justices in Anti-Doping Law: The Need to Ensure Fair
Athletic Competition Through Effective Anti-Doping Programs vs. the Protection of Rights of
Accused Athletes, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 161-66 (2006); CL Cole, Drafting Kelli White, 28 J.
SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 219, 219 (2004).
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even compared to the East Germans."l 5  It was suggested that the United
States be prevented from bidding to host the Olympic Games. 116 In short, the
international community viewed the United States as "the biggest cheaters in
the world.""17  In the words of Senator John McCain, Olympic doping
scandals "harm our image and will contribute to our image, whether deserved
or undeserved, that the United States is a bully and unethical." 118  Also
hurting our image were the professional sports scandals such as doping in
Major League Baseball. Although not within their jurisdiction, the World
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) has repeatedly embarrassed the United States
with its commentary on the lax baseball doping program.119 By the late
1990s, the international community apparently had had enough of doping.
The winning at all costs era, it seems, is over. 120
B. Paradigm Shift- Morality and Medals
It was out of this climate that there emerged a new paradigm for sport in
the late 1990s. While the private sector was delivering athletes who were
winning, they were no longer enhancing national prestige because of the cloud
of doping. 12 1 The United States Government, therefore, recalculated its
interest to reflect that it is no longer in the national interest to simply have
athletes who are successful in international athletic competition. It must do so
with the moral authority 22 that the United States does not cheat. 123 To that
115. S. 529, To Authorize Appropriations for the US. Anti-Doping Agency: Hearing on S. 529
Before the S. Conn. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 7 (2005) [hereinafter
Appropriations for the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency] (statement of Terrence Madden, CEO, USADA)
("Some people wanted to equate us with the East German System.").
116. Cole, supra note 114, at 220. Doping scandals were widely viewed as damaging a nation's
bid to host an Olympic Games, as it did with China's bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games.
117. Appropriations for the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 115, at 7-10 (statement of
Terrence Madden, CEO, USADA).
118. Cole, supra note 114, at 221.
119. Janice Lloyd, WADA Chief Approves of Congress' Work, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2008,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/2008-02-21 -notes-wada-congress-n.htm.
120. See Kidd et al., supra note 4, at 153 (stating that "as rapid globalization changes each
nation's often conflicted sense of itself, reactions to doping incidents turn out to be significant
markers of each country's position in the world diplomatic order").
121. See Houlihan, supra note 25, at 69 (explaining that the United States "realized that the
strengthening association between elite sport and drugs was undermining the utility of sport" in
international relations); Stewart, supra note 42, at 237 (noting that "doping is an intense international
issue, the focus of much publicity and controversy").
122. Stewart, supra note 42, at 242-43 (characterizing doping as a "moral issue").
123. Houlihan, supra note 25, at 69-70 (explaining the change of heart on doping by the United
States and other Olympic superpowers as "seeking to ensure the continuing utility of international
sport" for foreign relations purposes). Houlihan also noted that the participation by the United States
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end, the Executive Branch Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
and Congress made fighting drug use in Olympic Movement and professional
sports a top priority. The goal was to help restore the "honor and integrity" of
United States sport 124 and by extension, the United States itself.
To achieve this, ONDCP announced its national strategy to combat drug
use and doping in sports. 125 Initially, it was believed that it was necessary to
form a government agency with "certain governmental or quasi-governmental
powers" to tackle the issue. 126 With an eye toward restoring our national
image, ONDCP asserted that governmental status would improve the
accountability of anti-doping efforts and significantly enhance the United
States' credibility. 127 ONDCP was careful to assert that, while the entity it
proposed needed to be an instrumentality of the United States, it must also
reflect the free market view of sports regulation: "We have to be very
respectful of the notion of amateur sports and the independence of amateur
sports from federal intervention." 128 The ONDCP Strategy also involved
significant international efforts to develop what became WADA.
129
Ultimately, WADA was established and began operations on November 10,
1999.130 In August 2000, President Clinton, through Executive Order 13,165,
facilitated the United States Government's role in the World Anti-Doping
Agency' 3 ' stating that the Administration was adopting a policy to take
whatever steps were needed to fight doping in sport. 132 The United States'
role with WADA was hoped to have a substantial public image payoff. In the
words of former ONDCP head Barry McCaffrey, "that we created a World
Anti-Doping Agency in short order is astonishing... it's become an
institution that in the coming several years... will serve our purposes
well."' 133 In addition to its efforts to establish WADA, the United States
and other Olympic superpowers was due to a "reassessment" of national interests. See id. at 71-72.
124. Cole, supra note 114, at 219.
125. Effects of Performance Enhancing Drugs on the Health of Athletes and Athletic
Competition: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 106th Cong.
18-23 (statement of Barry McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy).
126. Id. at 20.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 12.
129. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, 481-82.
130. World Anti-Doping Agency, WADA History, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?
pageCategory.id=253 (last visited July 15, 2008).
131. Exec. Order No. 13,165, 3 C.F.R. 288 (2001), reprinted in 21 U.S.C. § 1701 (2003).
132. 3 C.F.R. 288 § 1.
133. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS, PROCEEDINGS: FIRST MEETING OF
THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG USE IN SPORTS 10 (Dec. 7, 2000) [hereinafter WHITE
HOUSE TASK FORCE] (keynote remarks of Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug
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Government was a leader in drafting the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC),
which was initially adopted on March 5, 2003.134
While the United States Government worked on the international level to
create WADA, it was also working domestically to create USADA. 135
Because of its importance to the United States' international image, both
ONDCP and Congress directly influenced how USADA would be structured
and what its mission would be. 136 Ultimately, USADA was not given
government agency status. It was established and began operations on
October 1, 2000137 as a private, not-for-profit corporation. 138  Through
legislation, Congress has "designated" USADA as the "official" anti-doping
agency for the United States, mandating that USADA conduct all Olympic
movement drug testing. 139  Congress has also stated that USADA shall
"ensure that athletes participating in amateur athletic activities recognized by
the United States Olympic Committee are prevented from using performance-
enhancing drugs or performance-enhancing genetic modifications
accomplished through gene doping." 140 To that end, Congress provides the
majority of USADA's funding. 141  Curiously, USADA's status and the
requirement that it conduct Olympic Movement drug testing are not part of the
Amateur Sports Act. The very brief legislation that outlines its funding and
duties is part of an Office of National Drug Control Policy funding statute. 142
However, USADA already has enhanced the United States' image abroad. As
Control Policy).
134. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply, supra note 46, at 104.
135. Jurith & Beddoes, supra note 14, at 475 (stating that "the formation of the United States
Anti-Doping Agency as an independent testing and prosecuting body for Olympic and international
competition is intended to restore credibility" to the United States); Wilson, supra note 5, at 76-77
(explaining that "to prove to the world" that the United States was committed to fair competition, the
United States created USADA and adopted the WADA Code).
136. See Koller, Does the Constitution Apply, supra note 46; see also Appropriations for the U.S.
Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 115, at 3 (testimony of Jim Scherr, Chief Executive Officer, U.S.
Olympic Committee) (noting that the committee "had a hand in creating" the USADA).
137. USADA, USADA History, http://www.usantidoping.org/who/history.html (last visited July
27, 2008).
138. Tygart, supra note 85, at 127.
139. See Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006, H.R. 6344, 109th
Cong. (2006).
140. See id. at § 701(b)(2); 120 STAT. 3534.
141. Appropriations for the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 115, at 7-10 (statement of
Terrence Madden, CEO, USADA) (explaining that, "As Jim stated, most of our funding now comes
from the federal government"). See also Pub. L. 109-469, Office of National Drug Control Policy
Reauthorization Act of 2006, Dec. 29, 2006 § 703 (authorizing appropriations of $9,700,000 for FY
2007 and $10,300,000 for FY 2008).
142. H.R. 6344 § 701.
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one former USOC official stated, USADA's actions have "largely dispelled
what was previously a widespread international impression that some
American athletes were drug cheaters, with their behavior condoned by their
respective sports federations." 143
USADA's effectiveness to a large extent depends on its "partnership" with
the federal government. For instance, prior to the 2004 summer Olympic
Games, the federal government raided a San Francisco area entity, the now-
infamous Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO), which was distributing
illegal performance-enhancing substances to professional and Olympic
athletes. One of the substances, known as "the clear," was specifically
manufactured to be undetectable in standard drug tests. Shortly after this raid,
the United States Senate took the "unprecedented"' 144 step of subpoenaing the
secret grand jury documents that were connected to the raid and turning the
documents over to USADA with the express purpose of disqualifying the
athletes who apparently had obtained performance-enhancing substances from
BALCO. 145 In addition to BALCO, USADA partners with the government
regularly to develop evidence and pursue sanctions against athletes. USADA
has continued to work with the government on a variety of investigations
involving the sale and distribution of performance-enhancing drugs, and the
Government has agreed to provide USADA once again with any evidence of
purchases by Olympic Movement athletes.146 Athletes who assist in federal
investigations hope to receive lighter penalties from USADA for their doping
offenses. 147
Moreover, because of the success USADA has enjoyed in pursuing
athletes who dope and in bolstering the United States' image, many members
of Congress and even the President have urged the professional sports leagues
143. Appropriations for the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 115, at 3-7 (statement of Jim
Scherr, Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Olympic Committee) Scherr also noted that the USADA has
"expanded its scope of activity, increased its aggressiveness and greatly improved its overall
effectiveness of operation, earning widespread respect both domestically and internationally." Id. at
22.
144. Appropriations for the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 115, at 2 (statement of Sen.
Ted Stevens) ("The actions we took as a committee last year ensured that the United States did not
send athletes who were not drug free to Athens. Those were unprecedented actions ....").
145. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply, supra note 46, 92-93; Appropriations for the U.S. Anti-
Doping Agency, supra note 114 (statement of Terrence Madden, CEO, USADA) (thanking the
committee for providing the documents that enabled the USADA to win all of its BALCO-related
actions against athletes).
146. See Amy Shipley, A Wider Front in the Doping Battle: Law Enforcement Takes the Lead in
Sports Probes, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2007, at Al.
147. Amy Shipley, Gatlin Will Claim Sabotage in Defense of Doping Charges, WASH. POST,
July 30, 2007, at Al.
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to adopt the World Anti-Doping Code and use USADA for testing and results
management. In 2003, the Chairman of WADA stated that he was considering
pressuring the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and international
sports federations to not hold competitions in the United States because of,
among other things, the professional leagues' refusal to adopt the WADA
standards.148 The President's 2004 State of the Union address, in which he
urged professional leagues to "get tough" and "to get rid of steroids now,"
followed.149 In 2005, Congress considered legislation, the Clean Sports Act
and the Professional Sports Integrity and Accountability Act, which would
have required uniform standards for doping control in professional sports. The
legislation would have made the World Anti-Doping Code, administered by
USADA, the applicable standard for doping control. 150  This proposed
legislation and the government's newfound interest in the issue likely had to
do with the enormous international pressure on the United States to take steps
to fight doping in professional, and not just Olympic Movement, sports.
It might be argued that with the government's change of heart on doping,
the link between sportive nationalism and sports doping has finally been
severed, or at least has been successfully restrained. The United States'
initiatives in helping to establish WADA and establishing USADA suggest
that a new era in international sport may be afoot, and the sportive nationalism
that so characterized the Cold War era is now over. Such a view, however,
fails to understand that sportive nationalism is a flexible concept that can
respond to the changing politics of the world. Sportive nationalism has not
been halted by triumphant anti-doping regulation. Instead, it seems that anti-
doping regulation is a more evolved manifestation of sportive nationalism.
Accordingly, it is no longer winning medals in Olympic Movement
competition that provides international prestige. The medals must be won
with moral authority. This change of position was apparent in the lead up to
the Beijing Olympic Games, as USOC officials have announced that unlike in
previous Olympic Games, the United States has no medal target for these
games.151 Instead, the USOC made it a top priority to "send a clean team to
Beijing" because of the international consequences of doping scandals. As
part of this effort, USADA recruited several top American athletes to
participate in Project Believe, requiring them to submit to extensive blood and
urine testing in the months leading up to the Games to demonstrate that they
148. Haagen, supra note 6, at 840.
149. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, supra note 6.
150. See generally id.
151. Shipley, Goals of United States Team, supra note 3.
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are not doping. 152 Whether or not it actually restores the integrity of sport, as
anti-doping initiatives purport to do, Project Believe has the potential to
burnish the United States international image and immunize our medal
winners from speculation that they are cheating.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTI-DOPING INITIATIVES
At first blush, the recognition that Congress and the Executive Branch are
finally taking doping in sport seriously should prompt acclaim, not skepticism.
However, the recognition that sportive nationalism led the United States to
ignore and accept athlete doping and is now prompting the United States to
fight it, does not end the matter. The awareness that anti-doping initiatives are
rooted in nationalism provides an opportunity to examine the potential
implications.
A. Anti-Doping Initiatives are Not Taken Seriously
While it is hard in the current climate to imagine the anti-doping zeal
waning, the most obvious implication for our current anti-doping efforts is that
anti-doping initiatives rooted in nationalism ultimately may not be taken
seriously. That is, because the international political climate is susceptible to
change, it may be that the anti-doping effort is not continued with as much
force as it is today. This could be the case if several nations, which purport to
adopt the World Anti-Doping Code, do not follow through, and suspicions of
athlete doping from countries such as China and Russia persist. It might also
happen if the cost in terms of medals lost is seen as too great. Scholars have
noted that because there is an "instrumental" view of elite international sport,
the commitment to fighting doping in sport might not remain as strong as it
appears to be now because "the perceived utility of international sport" might
diminish, or the cost, in the form of lowering the current levels of athletic
success, might be seen as too great. 153 Thus, the long-term appeal of reduced
athletic performance, and the public's attitude towards it, may not sustain our
current anti-doping efforts. 154
Moreover, because the anti-doping effort is not fully integrated into our
Olympic Movement structure, it is not far-fetched to imagine that such efforts
could be marginalized in the future. As mentioned above, USADA is not
152. Id.
153, Houlihan, supra note 25, at 75.
154. Thomas Boswell, There's Something in the Air, Other Than Another Ball Headed for the
Fence, WASH. POST, May 23, 2008, at El, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/05/22/AR2008052203868.html.
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mentioned in the Amateur Sports Act. Instead, it is given its status as the
United States' "official anti-doping agency" and funded through an ONDCP
grant program, not a dedicated stream of funding. In the past, USADA has
had to hire lobbyists to secure continued funding. 155 Unlike the USOC, which
was created by statute and has a dedicated, independent source of funding
through Congress's grant of exclusive use of the Olympic trademarks,
USADA's structure does not guarantee long term sustainability.
B. Anti-Doping Initiatives are Implemented in a Way that Threatens
Athletes'Rights
A second potential implication for anti-doping initiatives rooted in
nationalism is that the government temptation to ignore doping and do
whatever it takes to win is replaced with a temptation to do whatever it takes
to sanction athletes and clean up sport. Thus, anti-doping initiatives can be
implemented with the same "be the best" drive that led to the doping problem
in the first place. Taken to the extreme, the incentive might be to subvert the
values of due process - fairness, accuracy, and preventing tyranny over the
individual - in order for the United States to appear strong on the issue. In this
way, the anti-doping fight itself, instead of the medals won through doping,
can become a measure of the strength, character, and success of the United
States. This could lead the government to misuse its power over the Olympic
Movement to skirt traditional legal protections and be the best doping
"punisher" in the world.
This is of concern for two reasons. First, while USADA does operate with
Congress's designation that it is the "official anti-doping agency" for the
United States, 156 and despite its substantial relationship with the federal
government, like the USOC, it was deliberately created to be a "private" entity
that does not have to adhere to constitutional standards. There is evidence that
creating USADA in this way, despite early calls for it to be a full-fledged
government agency, 157 was to ensure that the United States could be tough on
doping without regard to athletes' constitutional rights. At the time USADA
was created, there were concerns that the United States would not be able to
establish an effective anti-doping agency because the constitutional rights of
privacy and due process could make enforcement difficult. 158 Government
155. Paul Singer, The Straight Dope, NAT. J., Sept. 18, 2004, (explaining that USADA has hired
two lobbying firms to represent its interests before Congress).
156. Pub. L. No. 107-67 § 644; 115 STAT. 514, 555 (2001).
157. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply, supra note 46, at 106.
158. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, supra note 133, at 7 (keynote remarks of Barry R. McCaffrey,
Director, Official National Drug Control).
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officials even questioned whether notions of due process should apply in the
sport setting. 159 The government's goal, fueled by concerns over the United
States' international image, was to aggressively pursue and sanction athletes
believed to have used performance-enhancing substances. In such a scenario,
the failure to apply constitutional protections to entities that are so clearly
acting with government assistance and influence has a paradoxical result.
Instead of protecting the liberty of such organizations to administer sport
without government interference in the form of constitutional restrictions,
deliberately creating "private" entities like the USOC and USADA protects
the government's ability to wield considerable influence in the regulation of
athletes. Government is not kept out through the USOC and USADA's private
status; it is in fact invited in to assert influence without traditional
constitutional checks. 160
Second, although the "private" status of the USOC and USADA mean
constitutional protections do not routinely apply to their conduct in all cases, I
have previously argued that in some circumstances an argument can be made
that USADA is a "state actor" so that constitutional limitations would apply to
its actions. 161 Under these circumstances, an examination of USADA testing
and sanctioning regime, implemented with government assistance and
approval, raises significant due process concerns. While doping control is
premised on protecting individuals, doping enforcement procedures in many
cases appear more concerned with outcomes and not individuals. 162 Such an
approach is fundamentally unfair because the government and government-
backed doping regulators enjoy the benefits of sportive nationalism while
imposing substantial burdens on individual athletes.
This is so because today's Olympic athletes have a strong claim that they
have a property right in their sporting careers that would trigger due process
protections. The due process protections that are given to athletes, however,
come up short of traditional notions of due process because in many respects
athletes are not given a meaningful opportunity to protect their eligibility. The
159. Id. at 35 (statement of Mickey Ibarra, Dir. of White House Intergovernmental Affairs)
(explaining that an athlete suspected of doping could be removed immediately from competition
before a hearing took place, because due process protections "ultimately undermine the effort" to
clean up sport). Other officials echoed these concerns, questioning whether due process protections
should have applicability in the fight against doping in sport. Id. at 56 (statement of Scott Blackmun,
description).
160. Koller, Frozen in Time, supra note 15, at 232.
161. Koller, Does the Constitution Apply, supra note 46, at 116.
162. This is demonstrated by the fact that doping violations are considered strict liability offenses
by the World Anti-Doping Code. "It is not necessary that intent, fault, negligence or knowing use on
the athlete's part be demonstrated." World Anti-Doping Agency, World Anti-Doping Code, art. 2.1.1,
8 (2003).
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current drug testing and adjudication regime administered by USADA, and
derived from its agreement to follow the protocols established by WADA
through the WADC, 163 makes it difficult, if not impossible, for athletes to
meaningfully defend themselves. USADA has stated that it can ban athletes
based on circumstantial evidence if the evidence "comfortably satisfied"
doping regulators that a violation had taken place. 164 Regulators do not need a
positive drug test but what is instead referred to as a "non-analytical
positive," 165 circumstantial evidence that is considered to be the equivalent of
a failed drug test. This low threshold for finding a doping offense is coupled
with the strict liability nature166 of doping regulation. Punishment for
unintentional use of a banned substance is often the same as that for
intentionally cheating. 167 This strict liability system and the "comfortable
satisfaction" standard together leave athletes with little room to clear their
name and unduly risks an unjust result. 168 Moreover, the presumptions built
in to the hearing procedures also afford athletes little ability to demonstrate
their innocence. 169
The sportive nationalism at work in the United States anti-doping
163. Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of
Arbitration for Sport Can Do Its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1221 (2005) (explaining that
"the substantive rules governing whether a doping offense has occurred" is governed by the World
Anti-Doping Code).
164. See World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 162; Tom Weir, Runners in the Cross Hairs, USA
TODAY, June 9, 2004, at IC. Officials have further explained that this standard is certainly less
stringent than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, but more than a "mere balance of
probabilities." Richard H. McLaren, An Overview of Non-Analytical Positive and Circumstantial
Evidence Cases in Sports, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 193, 203 (2006).
165. Weir, supra note 164.
166. Doping regulators assert that there is a powerful justification for the strict liability standard,
specifically the compelling need to protect the integrity of sport for all competitors. Moreover,
regulators note that requiring a showing of intent before a sanction could be imposed would "invite
costly litigation" that would "cripple" sporting federations. World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 162,
art. 2.1.1 Comment, at 8-9.
167. Michael Hiltzik, Presumed Guilty: Athletes See Doping Case Appeals as Futile Exercise,
L.A. TIMES. Dec. 11, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.latimes.com/sports/other/la-me-
dopingl decl 1,0,7716038.story.
168. The dissenting arbitrator in the Floyd Landis hearing concluded, "Because everyone
assumes an athlete who is alleged to have tested positive is guilty, it is not fashionable to argue that
laboratories should comply with strict rules. However, if you are going to hold athletes strictly liable
with virtually no possibility of overcoming a reported alleged positive test even in the face of
substantial and laboratory errors, fairness and human decency dictates that strict rules be applied to
laboratories as well."
169. Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices, supra note 68; Haagen, supra note 6,
at 838, 848 (describing the WADA Code as "an extremely athlete-unfriendly document" and noting
that "given the underlying substantive rules, the procedural rights are likely to be of small comfort to
the accused").
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movement can also provide a strong incentive to disregard procedural
protections for internationally high-profile athletes so that the United States
can be viewed by the international community as being aggressive on the issue
of doping. 170 Moreover, even when doping regulators "follow the rules" as
written, those rules, with strong United States Government backing, fall short
of meaningful due process. Given that athletes are no longer amateurs in the
traditional sense, but are individuals pursuing sporting careers, this process is
not sufficient. Because of these concerns, commentators have suggested that
the issue of how to best fight doping in professional sports should be left to the
collective bargaining process. 171
C. The Fight Against Doping Can Have Perceived Socio-Economic
Consequences
For the fight against doping to retain credibility, it must be perceived by
athletes and the public as fair. This is true not simply with the methods used
to test and the procedures used to adjudicate accused athletes, but also with
respect to who the anti-doping initiatives ultimately catch. Looking to fight
performance enhancing drug use in the most expedient way possible to bolster
the United States' credibility could mean that athletes who are members of
groups traditionally lower on the social-cultural hierarchy, such as racial and
ethnic minorities, are disproportionately affected. Sport, of course, is not
divorced from the traditional power relationships in society.1 72 Just like the
discretion to prosecute in our criminal system has demonstrated racial and
socio-economic consequences, it is naive to think that those same impulses do
not filter their way into sport regulation. Thus, it is not difficult to conclude
that in acting on nationalistic impulse to catch cheaters and restore the United
States' image in the international sporting community, some of the same
biases that are manifest in the criminal justice system may be manifest in the
170. Vicki Michaelis, BALCO Creates Inquiry Road Map; Investigation Creates New Ways to
Out Suspected Performance Enhancers, USA TODAY, Sept. 7, 2006, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2006-09-06-balco-doping-x.htm (explaining that "catching" Floyd
Landis and Justin Gatlin is "helping to lift the black marks ... on the U.S. image globally..." and
that "at a time when the U.S. Olympic Committee is contemplating a bid for the 2016 Summer
Games, that offers some comfort").
171. Haagen, supra note 6, at 846 (asserting that "[t]he WADA Code explicitly makes a series of
trade-offs in determining how to combat performance-enhancing drugs, and those trade-offs place
heavy burdens on participating athletes. Those costs are not speculative, they are real. They include
invasions of privacy and false positives. Congress should be very slow to take the decisions about
how to make those trade-offs in American professional sports out of collective bargaining."); see
generally Mitten, supra note 7.
172. See generally JAY COAKLEY, SPORT IN SOCIETY: ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES (7th ed.,
McGraw-Hill, 2001) (1978).
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anti-doping fight as well. Such a phenomenon plays out in several ways.
First, the United States has shown that it is interested in targeting athletes with
a high international profile and for which there will be a high international
relations payoff.'7 3 A number of these athletes are African-American, such as
Marion Jones and Justin Gatlin, among many others. Second, the focus on
sports like track and field can have a disproportionate impact on African-
American athletes as track and field is traditionally a sport with a significant
number of African-American participants, especially sprinters. Track and
field is one of the most tested sports by the USADA. 174 Indeed, all of the
athletes sanctioned by USADA as a result of the Senate providing BALCO
grand jury documents to USADA were African-American. Moreover, the use
of criminal law against athletes who have used or are alleged to have used
performance enhancing substances, such as Jones and Barry Bonds, who is
under indictment for perjury, also raises concerns. While the facts may
strongly support the actions taken against these athletes, it is undeniable that
they were selected for prosecution. In contrast, many white athletes such as
professional baseball players Roger Clemens and Andy Pettitte, also accused
of performance-enhancing drug use, were largely embraced on Capitol Hill
during Congressional hearings. These actions can create a perception that
African-American athletes are cheaters, 175 and reinforce long-held, damaging
social hierarchies.
Lawmakers and commentators have also noted the "odd" demographics of
those caught under Major League Baseball's drug testing program. For
instance, in 2005, it was noted that eight of the twelve players caught were
Hispanic and nearly all were foreign born. 176 Representative Bobby Rush, in a
hearing on performance enhancing drug use in professional sports, made the
same point, stating that while he wanted performance enhancing drug use in
professional sports eradicated, he also wanted "to be sure that players are
treated equitably and fairly." Rush explained that of the players suspended
from Major League Baseball and expelled from minor league baseball, "the
overwhelming majority of them are Latino or African-American." 77 While it
may be that all of the athletes targeted for criminal prosecution and
173. Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices, supra note 68.
174. In its most recent report, the USADA stated that it performed 1755 drug tests on track and
field athletes, by far the largest number for any sport. Athlete Test History, USADA,
http://www.usantidoping.org/what/stats/history.aspx (last visited July 28, 2008).
175. Gregory Moore, Cheaters Like Gatlin, Others Make Track a Modern Day Sodom, Aug. 27,
2006, http://blackathlete.net/artman2/publish/Track-ampField_36/CheatersLike_GatlinOthers_
MakeTrack_AModemDa 2267.shtml.
176. Haagen, supra note 6, at 845.
177. The Drug Free Sports Act of 2005, supra note 5 (statement of Rep. Bobby Rush).
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prosecution under sports doping codes are guilty of prohibited performance-
enhancing drug use, it is the perception that those who are caught are largely
members of minority groups that reinforces negative societal stereotypes and,
eventually, could pose troubling consequences for the credibility of anti-
doping initiatives.
D. The Fight Against Doping Can Develop Skewed Ethical Dimensions
Anti-doping initiatives rooted in nationalism can also have an effect on the
ethics of the doping debate. That is, where the movement to fight doping in
sports is grounded at least to some extent on enhancing the United States'
image, all of us as citizens can claim a stake in punishing offending athletes.
Such a claim obscures the ethical dimensions of the doping debate by creating
a new class of rights which can overshadow claims of rights made by athletes
who feel victimized by overzealous anti-doping regulations. Thus, political
leaders frequently speak of the fight against performance-enhancing drug use
as one necessary because doping "cheats us as fans" and as citizens and fans
we "want to protect the sports that we care so very much about."' 178 Indeed, it
is commonly asserted that sport "belongs to all of us here in America."' 179
While such inclusive expressions of sport underscore its nationalistic
tendencies, 180 it also tends to dilute the ethical claims made by athletes that
anti-doping initiatives are unfair. To the extent we see ourselves as having
rights in sports we do not play, and to which we have no obligations, but
merely observe as fans, any claim of right is certainly not as strong as rights
claimed by those who take on the burdens of sports training and regulation. 181
It is their rights about which we should be concerned, more than the rights of
ourselves as fans and citizens. If we do not like what we see in sport, we have
the right not to watch. An anti-doping fight grounded in nationalism can
unjustly expand this right not to watch into a right to impose punishment and
strip eligibility without proper concern for the harm to athletes.
178. Id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Cliff Steams).
179. Id. at 14.
180. Such claims of right also contradict the widely held view, supported by the government, that
sport is private.
181. See Angela J. Schneider & Robert B. Butcher, An Ethical Analysis of Drug Testing, in
DOPING IN ELITE SPORT: THE POLITICS OF DRUGS IN THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT supra note 4, at 129
(explaining the questionable ethical dimensions of the fight against performance-enhancing drug use,
including the fact that there is not a clear basis for banning performance-enhancing substances while
allowing other performance-enhancing techniques, the invasions of privacy perpetrated by the testing
protocol, and the coerced consent to testing, which is a prerequisite to the athletes' participation in
sport).
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V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the greatest consequence of an anti-doping fight rooted in
nationalism is that in simply responding in the most expedient way possible to
the image problems the United States had because of doping, our anti-doping
response has missed an opportunity to consider the real structure of the doping
problem and take genuine steps to combat it. Thirty-five years ago, before
anyone seriously considered a government response to doping, a former
Olympic athlete testified before Congress on drug use in sports and what
might be done about it. 182 He stated that it was superficial and idealistic to
view the problem as one at the level of the individual athlete so that the
individual athlete was the key moral decision maker in the decision whether to
dope or not. This athlete made an impassioned plea to Congress to examine
the structure of elite athletics that places on the athlete an enormous pressure
to win, as the process of participation is subordinated to the goal of
winning. 183 It is this structure, and the government's role in it, that should be
examined in any sincere attempt to eradicate doping in sport. Without such an
examination, our anti-doping initiatives are left to stand on the thin and
transient reed of sportive nationalism. Such a platform does not bode well for
the long term goal of preserving the integrity of sport. Accordingly, because
our anti-doping initiatives are anchored in a nationalistic impulse, and not in
an effort to change the dominant sports paradigm, 184 they ultimately may be
doomed to fail.
182. Proper and Improper Use of Drugs by Athletes: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. to
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 143-45 (1973) (statement of
Phil Shinnick, Director of Athletics, Livingston College, Rutgers University).
183. Id. at 134, 151 (explaining that the structure of American sport "has a high emphasis on
winning."); see also Steroids in Amateur and Professional Sports - The Medical and Social Costs of
Steroid Abuse: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 10 1st Cong. 46-47 (1989) (statement
of Dr. Charles Yesalis, Pennsylvania State University Professor) (explaining that the "appetite for
these drugs has been created by our society based on our interest in appearance and win at all cost"
instead of competing for competition's sake).
184. Ethicist Arthur Caplan also stresses this point, stating that "but if... your countrymen only
see gold medals as making the competition worthwhile..." then the integrity of sport is "in trouble."
Caplan also notes that "at the end of the day, if we don't want cheating in the Olympics, then we
cannot behave as if the one and only goal for each and every athlete is winning a gold medal ... if all
the honor, money and celebrity accrue only to those who finish first, then no matter what testing is
done, athletes will cheat... the best antidote to doping is not to create a culture in which only those
who finish first count." Arthur Caplan, PhD., The Losing Battle Against Doping: Why You May Be to
Blame for Drugs at the Olympics, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 26, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/1062921 1/.
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